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The Solidum in Solidarity 
Simon Derpmann (University of Münster) 
 
Abstract: 
The article looks at competing conceptions of solidarity. The main focus lies on the universality or partisanship that is associated 
with moral obligations stemming from solidarity. It appears that the reference to a 'solidum', or a uniting commonality, is crucial 
to understanding solidarity. In the article, solidarity is defended as a morally significant relation that is wider and more inclusive 
than direct or intimate relations of friendship, love or loyalty, but simultaneously narrower and more exclusive than universal 
notions of justice or humanity. Due to their basis in uniting communalities, relations of solidarity are normatively dependent, 
i.e. the moral content of the shared identifications that ground solidarity determine its moral valence. 
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Claims to 'Solidarity' 
'Solidarity' is a contested concept, both in social discourse 
and in moral philosophy. As the term appears in powerful 
political traditions, references to solidarity invoke strong 
normative associations. However, as different incompatible 
notions of 'solidarity' coexist in everyday uses, moral theory 
is confronted with the task of providing a systematic 
understanding of the concept that distinguishes and evaluates 
competing conceptions of solidarity. In the context of moral 
philosophy, the concept of solidarity ideally contributes to 
the systematic understanding of multiple facets of moral 
obligation, thus providing an instrument for reflecting our 
position in the social world as moral agents. 
My take on solidarity in the following focuses on the 
'solidum' that is at the etymological root of 'solidarity'. 
Accounts of the genesis of the relatively young term — 
'solidaire' appears in French around the middle of the 
eighteenth century – trace it back to Roman civil law, as 
Bayertz (1999, p. 3) or Brunkhorst (2005, p. 2) note. In this 
specific legal context, the obligatio in solidum, a 
commitment for an entirety or a whole, establishes a 
collective of debtors whose members are jointly liable for a 
common financial obligation. Every participant assumes 
responsibility not only for her individual share, but for the 
full common debt. The disposition to stand in for others 
increases the bargaining power of the collective, and thus 
enables a joint enterprise that could not be taken on by its 
dissociated individual members. This idea of empowerment 
stemming from mutual commitment is reflected in 
contemporary understandings of the social solidarities within 
labour unions, civil rights organizations or other movements 
of social empowerment. Thus, it appears plausible to base the 
systematic moral notion of solidarity on this initial reference 
to a solidum, a binding common point of reference. While the 
genesis of a term does not invariably determine its meaning 
in moral discourse, the reference to a commonality that unites 
individual persons through a common cause, a defining 
situation, or a shared history, alludes to a conception of 
solidarity that fills a specific gap in moral theory (see also 
Derpmann, 2009, 2018) between the universality of justice or 
beneficence and the intimacy of friendship, kith, and kin. In 
this understanding, 'solidarity' may be conceptualized as 
referring to special obligations within groups that are defined 
by morally relevant commonalities in identifications. 
Commitments of solidarity are not rooted in direct personal 
relations, but rather stem from identifications with shared 
experiences, ideals, or struggles. In the following, I argue for 
two claims: that solidarity requires a point of reference that 
is narrower than the universal realm of moral persons, and 
that the moral validity of solidarity is normatively dependent. 
Some forms of partiality towards communal unions may be 
described as relations of solidarity in a descriptive sense, but 
the constitution of the common point of reference, the 
solidum, may render them morally ineffective. This 
normative dependency, in turn, calls for the identification of 
basic criteria for legitimate forms of solidarity.  
Universal Solidarity 
Solidarity is often conceived as a universal relation that 
extends to all humans, a form of recognition that connects all 
moral subjects. However, the idea of a universal solidarity 
faces similar difficulties as references to universal friendship, 
universal comradery, or universal allegiance. What 
significance can my fellowship with you have, if I understand 
myself to be everyone’s companion alike? The unlimited 
extension of the scope of these forms of moral relatedness 
eventually renders their original meaning and significance 
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empty. I argue that, in the case of solidarity, these difficulties 
are related to the quality of the 'solidum', or the commonality 
that is essential to understanding the normative meaning of 
solidarity. The reference to universal solidarity is misleading 
in associating solidarity with a point of view that is defined 
by the regard of others solely as moral subjects, but at the 
same time it is not fully independent of moral considerations.  
A conception of solidarity as a universal relation appears 
in different accounts of solidarity in moral philosophy. David 
Wiggins (2006, p. 248; 2009, pp. 257–258) argues that 
solidarity consists in a responsiveness to others as persons 
with an ability to discover meaning and value, and to embrace 
and act on reasons. In this understanding, the perspective of 
solidarity establishes a fundamental relation that changes the 
quality of moral deliberation altogether. Wiggins (2009, p. 
268) identifies solidarity as "the [...] thing that any human 
being owes to any or all other human beings, namely the 
solidum that is presupposed to the ordinary morality of all 
interaction between human beings." This fundamental moral 
recognition establishes deontological side constraints, or 
absolute prohibitions. In this sense, solidarity resembles the 
Kantian idea of respect for autonomous persons as ends in 
themselves. But Wiggins (2009, pp. 233–236, pp. 247–249) 
emphasizes that the fundamental concern for others that he 
subsumes under 'solidarity' is not merely derivable from 
reason, but that it is linked to a fundamental moral sentiment. 
In a similar argument, Jürgen Habermas (1990, pp. 244–249) 
distinguishes the fundamental moral demands of justice that 
are directly based on the principles of discourse from 
complementary demands of sympathy or care that are based 
on solidarity. While moral justice substantiates negative 
obligations, solidarity – the reverse side of justice – requires 
moral subjects to strive at promoting the welfare of others. 
Thus, Habermas (1990, p. 244) supplements the discourse 
theory of morals with the relation of solidarity in order to be 
able to account for materially rich notions of social 
relatedness. In this description the 'shared life-context' 
relevant to solidarity is not economic class, social position, 
or political stance but society as a whole. So, here we have 
two conceptions of solidarity that identify the solidum with 
the realm of morality altogether. Wiggins understands the 
solidum to refer to the firmness of solidarity by making the 
relation of solidarity 'the root of the ethical', or the hard core 
of morality. For Habermas, the solidum is the realm of moral 
subjects viewed not only as rational subjects, but as 
consociates. 
Arguably, this understanding of the 'solidum', as the 
recognition of a universal characteristic of persons to develop 
an evaluative point of view, an ability to find meaning, or 
their worthiness of sympathy and care, results in an 
understanding of solidarity that fails to exhaust its potential 
as a systematic moral concept (see also Derpmann 2014, 
2018). There is a widely held alternative understanding of 
solidarity as a form of special obligation within distinct 
communities. The figurative fraternity – and sorority – of the 
French revolution and the comradery of class struggle share 
a conception of obligations of solidarity that are not 
obligations towards others as moral subjects but as members 
of distinct groups striving for distinct aims or devoting 
themselves to distinct values. In this understanding, 
solidarity occupies a specific role in moral deliberation. It 
constitutes a distinct form of obligation that cannot be 
subsumed under related ideas, such as friendship, loyalty, or 
companionship. Solidarity resembles these forms of special 
obligations in its partiality, and with regard to the moral 
significance of the specific position of the moral subject. Yet, 
it differs from them in its indirectness, and in its dependency 
on shared normative convictions. Solidarity can be 
distinguished from other associative or communal 
obligations, because it is not grounded in direct personal 
relations, but on common ideals and shared goals, or 
identifications. But, in order to be able to understand 
solidarity in this way, the point of reference of obligations of 
solidarity is essentially partisan, not universal. 
Richard Rorty (1989, p. 124) places the reference to a 
morally significant 'we' at the systematic core of solidarity, 
arguing that "the force of 'us' is typically contrastive in the 
sense that it contrasts with a 'they', which is also made up of 
human beings." The moral significance of this 'we' is 
different for the significance that Wiggins or Habermas could 
also claim to be entailed in the responsiveness to other 
persons. Based on a description from Simone Weil, Wiggins 
(2009, p. 250) captures a similar intuition of a normatively 
significant 'we' or 'us' that requires "to find in another a 
subject of the kind of consciousness that we ourselves know, 
or to find 'one of us' – one who may consent or refuse." 
However, the 'us' in this context is fundamentally different 
from the communal 'us' that can be argued to be essential to 
solidarity. The universal 'us' that is rooted the ability of moral 
subjects to consent or refuse is different, because the 
normative force of the reference to a commonality is not fully 
explicable through the neutral identification of a specific 
property or a capacity of another person. When others are 
embraced in a spirit of solidarity as fellows, companions, or 
allies, they are identified through a common morally 
significant property in agent-relative terms. They figure as 
'laid-off workers like me', 'nonbinary like me', 'republicans 
like me', etc. In these references, it is not the objectively 
perceived property of the other as being a laid-off worker or 
as non-binary, or republican that has moral significance, but 
our commonality of having a property that we deem of 
particular evaluative significance to ourselves as solidary 
subjects.  
From here, one can see what distinguishes solidarity as a 
communal recognition from solidarity as universal moral 
recognition. The moral significance that is missing in 
accounts of universal solidarity concerns the role of 
expressions like 'my' or 'our' as irreducible constituents of 
moral reasons that are indicative of communal obligation. 
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The obligation towards one's own community is not an 
obligation towards a number of persons with certain 
characteristics that are morally relevant regardless of one's 
position or perspective. That the respective community is 
one's own is a part of the content of the obligation that must 
be captured in order to grasp its moral force. In contrast, 
Weil's description of 'one of us' sharing the properties and 
capacities constituting moral subjectivity contains no similar 
significant reference to a commonality of these 
characteristics. It is the quality of the characteristics 
themselves – being a subject 'who may consent or refuse' – 
that establishes the moral requirement of respect, but not their 
commonality. In contrast, the communal understanding of 
solidarity entails a reference to a solidum that makes a 
specific moral difference. In these contexts, the reference to 
others as fellow whatevers carries an irreducible reflective 
reference to the solidary agent herself. In order to understand 
an obligation of solidarity towards co-workers or 
companions in a political movement, a person determines 
something meaningful about herself that relates her to others, 
be it a political struggle or a common identification with a 
specific way of life, or a pervasive experience. In her 
contribution to the present issue, Lisa Dillinger underlines 
that this specific perspective implies that moral subjects must 
deploy a different theoretical focus in their reflection of their 
solidarities, because they do not only examine what is 
morally valuable or obligatory from a neutral objective 
standpoint, but what aspects of moral significance are 
justifiably related to their own evaluative views. This makes 
reflecting on solidarity so fruitful for the context of education 
in particular and the development of an ethical self-
understanding in general. By reflecting on solidarities and 
their potential justification, moral subjects are confronted 
with the significance and limits of ethical plurality and the 
inevitable contingency of some of our evaluative 
commitments and moral relations. This may be of particular 
importance in those contexts of education in which the 
potential frictions of universal moral norms with moral 
commitments that are interconnected with one’s self-
development and self-identification come into view. This 
leads us to a second topic in the characterization of solidarity, 
namely the evaluation of the normative content of the 
communal identifications that establish solidarity in this 
understanding.  
Normative Dependency 
In the conception presented above, evaluative commonalities 
are seen as – at least potentially – morally significant. While 
one could reconstruct some aspects of the moral significance 
of solidarity in terms of the epistemic expectations that can 
be derived from shared social perspectives, the present 
conception of solidarity is committed to the claim that some 
commonalities themselves may ground moral relations of 
solidarity. It is not only that in calling for solidarity subjects 
are appealing to others that due to their shared social position, 
they should comprehend what it is like to be a single parent, 
an unskilled worker, or a person with a nonconformist 
sexuality, confession, or appearance. While the appeal to a 
shared epistemic experience of a social issue is of moral 
relevance, I argue that the commonality of solidarity goes 
beyond this.  
If reasons of solidarity are based on common 
identifications, i.e. on the shared commitment to evaluations 
that are deemed essential to one's self-understanding, then 
some solidarities become doubtful as sources of moral 
obligations due to the moral refutability of many conceivable 
identifications. So, solidarity appears to be normatively 
dependent (see Löschke 2015, p. 52 ff.) in the sense that some 
relations that may descriptively pass as relations of solidarity 
do not generate moral obligations due to the objectionability 
of the underlying commonalities, i.e. due to the content of the 
constitutive identifications. The mutually recognized 
commitment of mobsters, white-supremacists or despotic 
rulers may be descriptively classified as forms of solidarity, 
just as a promises to hurt or humiliate someone may be 
described as promises. But this does not mean that they bear 
moral significance. Not all objects of shared identification 
may be worth identifying with. So, if the moral validity of 
solidarity is dependent on the morality of its underlying 
identifications, are there criteria for legitimate and 
illegitimate solidarities?  
Objections to problematic identifications underlying 
questionable solidarities primarily concern contemptuous 
solidarities, and exclusionary forms of solidarity. While it is 
challenging to provide general criteria for admissible forms 
of identification that are capable of generating communal 
obligations of solidarity, some identifications – e.g. among 
sexists or racists – clearly fail to create a moral bond of 
solidarity, because of their incompatibility with fundamental 
moral norms like the recognition of moral subjects as equals, 
the recognition of persons as ends in themselves, etc. Of 
course, a reply to this basic rejection of contemptuous 
solidarities objects that solidarity itself – at least in the 
definition given above – is designed not to understand moral 
subjects as equals due to its essential partiality. Is solidarity 
not immoral by definition due to its exclusive core that is, in 
turn, derivative of its essential partiality? Solidarity is 
necessarily partial and – to some extent – exclusive due to the 
presumed dependency on an identification that establishes a 
morally significant 'we'. However, some qualifications show 
that not all forms of solidarity are vulnerable to this objection, 
at least if it is meant to unavoidably link solidarity to 
divisiveness and chauvinism.  
Partiality is compatible with recognizing others as equals. 
A person may identify with a conviction of hers and feel 
especially obliged to those who share this conviction without 
presuming that others are objectively of a secondary moral 
status or deserving of a lesser moral recognition. The point in 
relational obligations like solidarity, friendship, loyalty, or 
love is that particular others are special to me, not that they 
are special per se. However, one may object that some 
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common forms of solidarity are 'closed' in the sense that they 
appear to be based on natural features or a confinement to a 
fixed group. They are not permeable to groups of subjects 
who are inevitably and immutably conceived as others. If 
racism or sexism are problematic due to their rationale of a 
moral distinction based on unchosen characteristics – the 
'naturalness' of which is, of course, questionable –, why not 
the delimitation entailed in the solidarities among women or 
among persons of color? Should we deny moral relevancy to 
any club membership that is based on natural features? Note, 
however, that there is a crucial difference between the 
rationale underlying racism or sexism and the moral cohesion 
in the – arguably solidary – movements that respond to 
racism and sexism. Solidarity within particular social 
movements derives from a shared conviction – that there 
should be gender equality or that Black lives matter –, not 
from a descriptive characteristic. Some aspect of these kinds 
of solidarities, however, may be based on a shared opposition 
to being subjected to a social position that serves as a point 
of reference, and this position may be tied to an experience 
of discrimination or oppression related to the conferral of 
racial or sexual categorizations that cannot simply be 
assumed by others. So, there may be forms of solidary 
connectedness that require being Black or being a woman, 
etc. The decisive difference is that these communalities, if 
they are to be understood in terms of solidarity, do not stem 
from a given characteristic alone, but from the identification 
with a social position that may be only fully grasped from the 
experience of being in this position. So, while solidarity 
among feminists is not exclusive to women or female 
persons, the social implication of being female or being a 
woman in a given society, may warrant an additional layer of 
solidarity in this context. This leads to another observation 
regarding the constitution of solidarities. 
Solidarities are multilayered. While solidarity is 
exclusive – in the sense that it requires a conception of those 
who belong to a group, and those who do not – moral subjects 
do not typically affiliate with only one single group, but 
engage with many facets of their social belonging, thus 
creating overlapping layers of solidarities. In this context, 
Amartya Sen (2006, pp. 20–24) warns against 
misunderstanding our identities via 'singular affiliations'. 
Even supposedly clearly delimited forms of identification 
turn out to be multilayered. A 'Black Lives Matter'-activist, 
for instance, may have several identifications that belong to 
this particular aspect of her self-understanding, and that 
extend to different circles of potential solidary allies. She 
may identify as Black, as a person of color, as an African 
American, as a BLM activist, as the subject of discrimination 
or oppression, as an enemy of racial injustice, or for that 
matter as an enemy of social injustice altogether, etc. Thus, 
although the semantics of solidarity requires a 'we' and a 
'they', this does not mean that societies must be conceived as 
divided into monolithic blocks through the manifestation of 
solidarities. Rorty (1989, pp. 191–192) convincingly makes 
this argument for an indirect societal cohesion through the 
interweaving of multiple solidarities. Thus, while solidarity 
may be considered as exclusive, the multiplicity of 
solidarities may nevertheless generate wide reaching forms 
of social cohesion. 
The main takeaway from the preceding observations may 
be that, even though solidarity is not necessarily problematic 
qua being a form of communal partiality, the moral reliance 
on concrete solidarities requires the thorough reflection of the 
underlying unifying convictions and a readiness for 
justification and scrutiny of the constitution of the solidum in 
solidarity. The main work of moral justification in the context 
of sustaining solidarity lies here, and it is messy work, 
because it requires of us to figure out our own complex 
evaluative perspective, the legitimacy of deriving moral 
reasons from it, and the various circles of subjects with whom 
we may feel significantly connected above the basic 
requirements of moral respect. One's solidarities are not as 
neatly organizable as club membership cards, and the 
strength of the accompanying obligations varies, especially 
when they are weighed against competing neutral 
obligations. Solidarity requires constant reflection upon who 
we are and which of our experiences, characteristics, or 
convictions we deem central enough to substantiate and 
justify special moral relations that go beyond what is owed 
to every moral subject alike. 
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